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Abstract
Mechanism realists assert the existence of mechanisms as objective structures in the 
world, but their exact metaphysical commitments are unclear. We introduce Local 
Hierarchy Realism (LHR) as a substantive and plausible form of mechanism real-
ism. The limits of LHR reveal a deep tension between two aspects of mechanists’ 
explanatory strategy. Functional decomposition identifies locally relevant entities 
and activities, while these same entities and activities are also embedded in a nested 
hierarchy of levels. In principle, a functional decomposition may identify entities 
engaging in causal interactions that crosscut the hierarchical structure of composi-
tion relations, violating the mechanist’s injunction against interlevel causation. We 
argue that this possibility is realized in the example of ephaptic coupling, a subsidi-
ary process of neural computation that crosscuts the hierarchy derived from synaptic 
transmission. These considerations undermine the plausibility of LHR as a general 
view, yet LHR has the advantages that (i) its metaphysical implications are precisely 
stateable; (ii) the structure it identifies is not reducible to mere aggregate causation; 
and (iii) it clearly satisfies intuitive and informal definitions of mechanism. We con-
clude by assessing the prospects for a form of mechanism realism weaker than LHR 
that nevertheless satisfies all three of these requirements.
1 Introduction
Mechanistic explanation has emerged as a popular account of explanation across 
much of philosophy of science, especially for cognitive neuroscience, biology, and 
chemistry. This account suggests that to explain a phenomenon is to discover a 
mechanism that produces it. Crucially, for many mechanists, mechanisms differ from 
models and other idealized, counterfactual, or instrumental constructs of science, in 
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that mechanisms are actual parts of the world. Models, diagrams, simulations, or 
other descriptions may represent a mechanism, but the mechanism itself is a struc-
ture in the world, independent of our aims and interests, and it is this real structure 
that plays an explanatory role (either constitutively, for ontic accounts of explana-
tion, or by reference, for epistemic accounts). Call this general position mechanism 
realism, i.e. realism about those features of a physical system referred to by a suc-
cessful mechanistic explanation.
The exact metaphysical commitments of mechanism realism are unclear. Most 
generic definitions of mechanism commit the realist to (i) entities, performing (ii) 
activities, in a way that is (iii) organized (see e.g. Machamer et al. 2000; Glennan 
2002; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005). While entities are a relatively unproblematic 
item in the metaphysician’s toolkit, activities and organization are less standard, and 
they suggest two distinct routes for fleshing out a metaphysics of mechanisms. One 
route takes activities to be a new ontological category, distinct from causal inter-
actions understood in a generic sense. This move is suggested by Machamer et al. 
(2000), and has been influential in distinguishing their view from that of Glennan 
(1996). Nevertheless, it’s a strategy that faces challenges, as even proponents find it 
difficult to determine necessary and sufficient conditions for an activity (Machamer 
2004; cf. Krickel 2018), and detractors argue that mechanists must grant both prop-
erties and counterfactuals, rendering activities supererogatory (Psillos 2004).
Here, guided by our own preference for a desert ontology, we explore an alter-
native route toward a realist metaphysics of mechanisms. We assume activities are 
mere causal interactions, and ask whether there is a distinctive structural constraint 
placed on entities and activities by the mandate that mechanisms be ‘organized’. 
We take it as a success condition for this project that a distinctively mechanistic 
mode of organization identify some arrangements of entities and their interactions 
as mechanisms, and rule out others as not. Thus we reject a view on which attribut-
ing ‘mechanistic’ structure to a system amounts to no more than attributing causal 
structure (e.g. Wilhelm 2019). A central tenet of the mechanist movement is that 
mechanistic explanation is distinct from, and more metaphysically ambitious than, 
explanations that merely aggregate causes (see e.g. Craver and Bechtel 2007; Craver 
2015; Darden 2002; Raerinne 2011). If mechanistic explanation is distinct from 
causal explanation, then realists about mechanisms should hold out for a metaphys-
ics that does not merely reduce mechanisms to a collection of causes.
The remainder of this paper elucidates and critiques one prima facie plausible 
way to characterize the distinctive structure of mechanisms, which we call Local 
Hierarchy Realism (LHR). Although ultimately we abandon LHR as untenable, we 
think it is constructive to consider it seriously for several reasons. First, LHR is intu-
itive and easy to visualize, and plausibly informs much of the construction of mech-
anistic explanation in the sciences—if we reject LHR, then we should also be wary 
of intuitive discussions of mechanism structure, or of putting any ontological weight 
on diagrams and other easy to digest representations of mechanisms.1 Second, LHR 
1 Our claim is not that mechanistic explanations in general satisfy LHR, but rather that some intuitive 
understanding of LHR drives the search for mechanistic explanation. This is an empirical claim that goes 
beyond the scope of this paper, but to see why it might be plausible, notice that diagrams and intuitive 
visualizations satisfying LHR play a substantive role in mechanism discovery (Sheredos et al. 2013), and 
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treats hierarchical structure as highly localized and pluralistic, and thereby serves as 
a bridge between discussions of hierarchy in philosophy of science and in metaphys-
ics. Where philosophers of science have rejected the thoroughgoing hierarchy real-
ism of Putnam and Oppenheim (1958), metaphysicians have attempted to save some 
tempered version of it, as debates about fundamentality, grounding, and emergence 
all seem to presuppose a stratification of nature into levels (Kim 2002). The chal-
lenge we raise for LHR, however, concerns the possibility of crosscutting levels, and 
thus also challenges the tempered versions of levels advanced so far amongst meta-
physicians (e.g. List 2019). Third, formalizing LHR suggests specific ways forward 
for a structural account of the metaphysics of mechanisms, and indeed of levels-talk 
more broadly.
The final, and perhaps most important, reason to examine LHR is that its limi-
tations reveal an unrecognized tension between two aspects of mechanistic expla-
nation that serve to distinguish mechanisms from mere aggregate causes. On the 
one hand, mechanisms are typically understood as mechanisms for the production 
of some phenomenon (Machamer et al. 2000: 3; Glennan 2002: S344; Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2005: 423; Illari and Williamson 2012: 120), and attributing the func-
tion of producing this phenomenon to a mechanism identifies and individuates it 
(Garson 2013; Shagrir and Bechtel 2017). More generally, attributing functions to 
a mechanism as a whole and subsidiary functions to its parts serves to identify a 
substantive organizational structure over and above mere causal aggregation. On 
the other hand, the construction of an effective mechanistic explanation is typically 
taken to involve both ‘looking down’ at the internal structure of the components of 
a mechanism and ‘looking up’ at the broader pattern of activities in which a mecha-
nism as a whole participates (Bechtel 2009). The resulting picture is one of a hier-
archy of multiply embedded mechanisms, with component entities at any one level 
themselves treated as mechanisms at a finer grain, and decomposed into lower-level 
entities and activities. Likewise, any mechanism may itself be treated as a unitary 
component, or an entity in a higher-level, more coarse-grained mechanism (Craver 
2001, 2015; Glennan 2005). The stratification of mechanism entities and activities 
into a local hierarchy of levels also suggests a substantive organization that may not 
be reduced to mere aggregate causes (Craver 2015; Craver and Bechtel 2007).2
We demonstrate that the decomposition of a mechanism into entities and activi-
ties through function attribution, and the subsequent arrangement of mechanistic 
2 In what follows, we draw on influential comments from prominent figures in the mechanisms literature, 
such as Craver, Bechtel, and Glennan. We do not intend to attribute LHR, nor indeed any specific meta-
physical view, to any of these authors individually. Rather, we think the views they separately articulate 
represent commitments that large segments of the mechanism community endorse, or at least take seri-
ously. Consequently, it is worthwhile to investigate the metaphysical implications of these claims taken 
as a whole.
also that, anecdotally, scientists studying mechanisms often have only a hazy view of what a mechanism 
amounts to, and for this very reason have found it productive to collaborate with philosophers, for exam-
ple, molecular biologist John Moult’s collaboration with philosopher Lindley Darden on the MecCog 
mechanism representation system (Kundu et al. 2020).
Footnote 1 (continued)
 J. Dewhurst, A. M. C. Isaac 
1 3
components into a hierarchy of levels, place inconsistent demands on mechanism 
structure. This follows as an a priori possibility from the observation that the dif-
ferent functional roles contributing to a process for generating some phenomenon 
may induce ‘crosscutting’ hierarchies of causal relations (Sect. 3). We add empirical 
weight to this a priori argument through the example of ephaptic coupling, a func-
tional mechanism in neuroscience that contributes to the phenomenon of neural fir-
ing, and appears to undermine realism about the hierarchical mechanistic structure 
of neuron–neuron interactions performing neural computation (Sect. 4). Finally, we 
articulate the formal conditions LHR places on the interaction between composition 
and causality (Sect. 5). This formulation of the metaphysical commitments of LHR 
suggests a way forward for precisely articulating weaker forms of mechanism real-
ism that nevertheless make substantive claims about the organization of entities and 
activities in the world.
We conclude by posing a challenge for the structural approach to the metaphys-
ics of mechanisms. On the one hand, LHR has strong intuitive appeal and is easy to 
visualize, but these appealing features may only be preserved by mechanism realists 
if they can find some resolution to the apparent tension between functional decom-
position and hierarchical mechanism construction. On the other hand, abandoning 
LHR leaves a large and relatively unexplored space of metaphysical possibilities 
richer than mere aggregation of causes. Nevertheless, these possibilities are diffi-
cult to grasp intuitively, and do not obviously conform to the qualitative understand-
ing of mechanism derived from scientific explanations. Consequently, it seems the 
burden falls on the would-be non-LHR mechanism realist to defend some weaker 
account of the ontological implications of mechanistic explanation as worthy of the 
name ‘mechanism.’
2  Function Attribution and Local Hierarchy Realism
In this section, we motivate Local Hierarchy Realism by looking at the process by 
which mechanistic explanations are constructed, and clarify the sense in which plau-
sible mechanism hierarchies should be understood as purely local in scope.
Mechanistic explanation typically begins by identifying a target phenomenon (cf. 
Shagrir and Bechtel 2017), and positing a mechanism with the function of produc-
ing that phenomenon (Garson 2013). The components of a mechanism are often also 
mechanisms in their own right, performing subsidiary functions that contribute to 
the overall function of the top-level mechanism, and in general attributing functions 
to both a mechanism and its parts appears necessary for recovering a non-trivial 
notion of mechanistic organization. Nevertheless, mechanism realists typically do 
not wish to include functions as part of their primitive ontology, but rather explain 
away, reduce, or derive functions from evolutionary history (Millikan 1989; Nean-
der 1991), selective pressures (Garson 2017), or “objective goals” (Maley and Pic-
cinini 2017). On the most deflated view of function attribution, it serves merely as 
a heuristic, capturing the perspective of the researcher on the target phenomenon 
(Craver 2013; Cummins 1975; Darden 2008; Glennan 2017; Hardcastle 1999; Käst-
ner 2018).
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Function attribution and functional analysis serve to isolate some set of entities 
and identify the characteristic activities they engage in to produce a target phenom-
enon. However, isolating these entities and identifying their characteristic activi-
ties is not yet enough to show they constitute more than mere aggregate causes. On 
the contrary, the deflated view of functions explicitly asserts that the interactions 
between mechanistic entities are merely causal interactions. Yet the process of func-
tional analysis does suggest a substantive metaphysical constraint, once we examine 
how it relates mechanisms to one another. Functional analysis iteratively decom-
poses a complex system into a hierarchy of subsystems arranged into levels of com-
ponents at increasingly finer grain, where each level of this hierarchy may serve as 
a “mechanism sketch” (Piccinini and Craver 2011; Shagrir and Bechtel 2017). The 
upshot is that mechanisms are arranged into hierarchies, such that the constituent 
entities (components) of any mechanism may themselves be treated as mechanisms 
at a finer grain, and decomposed into lower-level entities and activities. Moving up 
the hierarchy, any mechanism may itself be treated as a unitary component, or an 
entity in an even higher-level, more coarse-grained mechanism (Bechtel 2009). The 
picture is one of arbitrarily many nested levels of entities, each engaging in char-
acteristic activities at some fixed level of the hierarchy (Fig. 1; Craver 2001, 2015; 
Glennan 2005).
To see how this works, consider the oft-discussed example of the heart. The 
rhythmic contraction of the heart serves as a target phenomenon: how might we 
explain this? A mechanistic explanation must start from a (perhaps tentative) attri-
bution of function. For instance, William Harvey’s insight that the heart could be 
Fig. 1  A schematic version of the hierarchical structure of mechanisms. Black arrows indicate causal 
interactions, whereas dashed lines indicate the composition relation between levels. As typically under-
stood, there can be no causal interaction between levels, and a level is defined in terms of the causal 
interactions between its parts (components)
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understood as functioning analogous to a pump identifies component entities, such 
as the right ventricle and aortic valve, and assigns them subsidiary functions, such as 
expelling blood and preventing blood flow from reversing. One might then take one 
of these entities, say the right ventricle, and provide a mechanistic explanation of its 
characteristic behavior. Here, the subsidiary function of expelling blood assigned 
to the ventricle at a higher level, becomes the primary function that then serves to 
define subsidiary functions to its component entities, such as the contraction func-
tion of muscle cells and the joining function of the intercalcated disks. Conversely, 
one might step back from the heart as a whole, and consider its pumping as a sub-
sidiary function within the broader mechanism of the circulatory system. In gen-
eral, analyses of mechanistic function cascade through levels of a hierarchy, as the 
attribution of a functional role to an entity at one level of the hierarchy will both 
determine which entities and activities are identified as components of that entity’s 
mechanism at the next level down, and constrain the kinds of broader functional role 
that entity can perform at the next level up (cf. Cummins 1975).
Call realism about this hierarchical arrangement of mechanisms into levels ‘Local 
Hierarchy Realism’, or LHR. LHR is the view that, once we have specified a tar-
get phenomenon, there is some fact of the matter about the hierarchical structure 
of the mechanism that explains it, i.e. how it ought to be decomposed and which 
components and subcomponents will appear at which level of the hierarchy. LHR 
is a metaphysically substantive view that does not reduce to a mere aggregation of 
causes. Our claim is not that any particular mechanist has explicitly defended LHR, 
but rather that it follows naturally from the generic account of mechanistic explana-
tion as articulated by philosophers of mechanism, and that it has intuitive appeal as 
an easy to visualize metaphysical picture, a straightforward reification of common 
mechanism diagrams like Fig. 1. To better flesh out LHR, let’s look at two possible 
points of confusion.
First, it is crucial to stress that LHR is a thesis about both mereology and causa-
tion. At first blush, it may seem that the talk of entities decomposing into mecha-
nisms at lower levels implies only a mereological hierarchy. However, the ‘activities’ 
within each level of a mechanism should be understood as highlighting the relevant 
aspects of its internal causal structure (i.e., for producing the target phenomenon), 
and because mechanists typically take causation to be strictly intra-level, this struc-
ture is also constrained by LHR. This means that a mechanistic analysis of causal 
structure is also going to be an analysis of hierarchical structure, and vice versa (we 
make this claim more precise and explore its metaphysical implications in Sect. 5). 
The strict commitment to accepting only intra-level causes is confirmed in the com-
plete rejection of inter-level causation by many mechanists (Baumgartner and Cas-
ini 2017; Craver and Bechtel 2007; Kaiser and Krickel 2017; Romero 2015). Most 
notably, Craver and Bechtel (2007) argue that any putative cross-level causation is 
always reducible “without remainder” to a combination of composition relations 
across levels and intra-level causation. For instance, the saturation of photopigment 
in cone cells does not cause the eye to transduce light into neural signals; rather, 
photopigment is a constitutive, lower-level component of the mechanism of the eye, 
which as a whole, at a higher level, participates in an intra-level causal interaction 
between light and electrical activity in the brain (Craver and Bechtel 2007: 555). We 
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call this the Craver–Bechtel (C–B) principle. The C–B principle provides LHR with 
a principled approach to subsuming putative counterexamples into a single mecha-
nistic hierarchy, by explaining away apparent inter-level causes in terms of composi-
tional relations and intra-level causes.
Second, in order to be plausible, LHR should not imply universal hierarchy real-
ism (UHR). UHR holds that the entirety of nature is neatly organized into a hierar-
chy of levels of scale and interaction, a view most famously endorsed by Putnam 
and Oppenheim (1958). Although once widely held, this view has been largely 
discredited by detailed scientific examples, especially from the biological sciences 
(e.g. Potochnik 2017). Any plausible form of realism about levels should accept 
that mechanisms are a purely local affair, and thus that their hierarchical structure 
is also purely local. In fact, many mechanists are strongly opposed to making any 
claims at all about global hierarchies, or about how the levels of one mechanistic 
hierarchy might relate to those of another mechanism (e.g. Povich and Craver 2017; 
Eronen 2015; however argues such stringent locality does not capture how levels are 
actually described in the biological sciences). There are two distinct ways of inter-
preting the claim that mechanism hierarchies are local: they could be functionally 
local or they could be spatiotemporally local. Spatiotemporal locality is satisfied if a 
hierarchical arrangement of entities is tightly circumscribed by a well-defined spati-
otemporal boundary, such as the hierarchy of organelles, proteins, and amino acids 
within a cell (cf. Craver 2007: 191). Functional locality is satisfied when a hierar-
chy is restricted to levels emerging through decomposition with respect to a tightly 
circumscribed functional attribution; for instance, sodium ions in the brain may be 
organized in levels with different sets of entities depending on whether their func-
tional role in metabolism or in neural computation is under investigation. Either type 
of locality would be enough to prevent LHR from collapsing into UHR, but we think 
the most plausible form of LHR should take the most stringent route, and attribute 
reality only to the levels of mechanisms that are both functionally and spatiotempo-
rally localized.
3  The Crosscutting Threat to Local Hierarchy Realism
LHR derives its metaphysical commitments from an explanatory practice that itera-
tively embeds mechanism levels through cascading function attributions. Yet this 
practice only contingently produces a consistent hierarchy, and in principle allows 
subsidiary function attributions to produce levels that crosscut one another. This 
kind of crosscutting would be inconsistent with the central claim of LHR, i.e. that 
each mechanism possesses a unique hierarchical structure about which we ought to 
be realists.
Our core argument is as follows. Functional decomposition specifies intra-level 
causal structure. Once intra-level causal relations are fixed, inter-level composition 
relations are constrained to induce a hierarchy of levels. However, a single phenom-
enon may in principle induce multiple functional decompositions, and competing 
function attributions may fix different causal relations as intra-level, which in turn 
induce their own hierarchies of composition relations. Since hierarchical structure 
 J. Dewhurst, A. M. C. Isaac 
1 3
is derived from intra-level causal structure (and not vice versa), and since intra-level 
causal structure is fixed by function attribution, functionally local mechanistic hier-
archies are vulnerable to the possibility that causal relations picked out by subsidi-
ary function attributions crosscut one another. In principle these functionally local 
crosscutting hierarchies may be spatiotemporally local as well, thereby threatening 
LHR. The remainder of this section elaborates some contentious steps in this argu-
ment in more detail.
Function attribution specifies intra-level causation. Suppose we have specified a 
target phenomenon and need to determine the structure of the mechanism that pro-
duces it through functional decomposition. Craver identifies three kinds of function 
attribution in mechanistic model building: etiological, input–output (I–O), and con-
textual. It is the second of these that is critical for determining intra-level causation, 
namely “function [as] a mapping from inputs to outputs in conformity with a rule” 
(2013: 149). To attribute an I–O function to a putative mechanism component is to 
identity some causal influences (‘inputs’) and some characteristic activities (‘out-
puts’) as constitutive of that component’s role in producing the explanandum phe-
nomenon. This I–O attribution assigns these putative causal relations a special status 
in the context of model construction, because the C–B principle admits only intra-
level causal relations within a single mechanistic system. Since the entities that input 
to a component, the activities that component outputs, and the entities impacted by 
those activities all interact causally, they are thereby constrained to fall on the same 
level of the mechanism, as ontological (and compositional) equals.3
Intra-level causal relations induce mechanistic hierarchy. Once a single level of 
a mechanism is fixed, the complementary processes of ‘looking up’ and ‘looking 
down’ elaborate it into a hierarchy, in a manner heavily constrained by the causal 
structure functionally attributed to the reference level. Looking down, each compo-
nent of the reference level that performs an I–O function may itself be broken down 
into subcomponents performing subsidiary functions. Crucially, the spatial and 
functional scope of these subcomponents within the mechanism is constrained by 
the initial analysis:
Isolated descriptions of an X’s ϕ-ing specify the activity for which a lower-
level mechanism will be sought and so fix the active, spatial, and temporal 
boundaries of that mechanism. (Craver 2001: 65; cf. 2013: 151)
Likewise, looking up, one may treat a pattern of causally interacting entities at one 
level as constituting a single entity (component) at a higher level. This higher-level 
entity itself performs an I–O function, analyzable in terms of intra-level causal rela-
tions at that higher level (Bechtel 2009).
3 This point should also clarify our use of the C-B principle: we take it to be a symmetrical constraint 
that holds between composition and causal relations. Conversely, one might take it to be an asymmetrical 
constraint, for instance, constraining causal relations on the assumption of composition relations (but not 
vice versa). This reading has been suggested to us by a reviewer; however, our own view is that, provided 
one assumes that mechanisms must be functionally local, the arguments of Craver and Bechtel (2007) are 
strong enough to motivate the symmetrical principle as well.
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It is critical for what follows to recognize that, while composition relations 
respect a mechanistic hierarchy, the stratification of a mechanistic explanation into 
levels is driven in the first instance by function attribution. Here we disagree with 
Craver, who suggests in places that.
Levels of mechanisms are defined fundamentally by . . . the componency rela-
tionship between things at higher and lower levels. (Craver 2015: 19)
In contrast, we take compositional relations at lower and higher levels to be con-
strained by the entities at some initial level. Since these initial ontological bounda-
ries are themselves determined by a prior functional analysis, hierarchical structure 
is ultimately determined by function attribution. Furthermore, function attribution, 
in the form of subsidiary functions derived from the decomposition of the higher-
level mechanism function (or the upwards embedding of a lower-level mechanism 
function), continues to play the driving role in level membership, since it picks out 
relevant causal and ontological structure at subsequent levels, ensuring that hierar-
chical stratification is functionally local (cf. Cummins 1975).
Since this is a contentious point, it’s worth reflecting in more detail on why func-
tional analysis is prior to mereological analysis: couldn’t one first parse the puta-
tive mechanism into relevant parts, and only after attribute functions to those parts? 
If that were the case, then compositional structure would be independent of func-
tional analysis. There is a strong intuition that beginning from mereological analysis 
should be possible. Consider a paradigmatic mechanism, e.g. a grandfather clock: 
aren’t the gears, chains, weights, springs, face, and cabinet all easily identifiable as 
hierarchically arranged components, even if we have no idea whatsoever how a clock 
works, or what it is for? But this intuition it misguided, for it ignores the substantive 
role played by judgments of similarity and relevance in any such decomposition. 
Why is the suggested breakdown different from one that decomposes the clock into 
left and right halves, or metal components and wood components, or small parts and 
large parts? In fact there are too many ‘natural’ ways to decompose the clock into a 
hierarchy of parts, each assuming a different answer to the question of what features 
of its physical composition are relevant for determining part boundaries and com-
position relations—mereology is wholly unconstrained without some principle of 
relevance by which to distinguish those properties that contribute to part individua-
tion from those that do not. Functional analysis provides this principle of relevance, 
at least so far as mechanistic explanation is concerned. Attributing the function of 
doorstop, or objet d’art, or timekeeping device to the clock will distinguish different 
properties as relevant, thereby initiating different mereological decompositions.
Crosscutting hierarchies undermine LHR. So, functional analysis determines 
the stratification of a putative set of embedded mechanism components into levels. 
Since hierarchy realism is local, in the sense that it only applies to hierarchies that 
are both spatiotemporally and functionally localized, one might think that there is no 
danger of inconsistencies across the mechanism levels that are strung together by a 
cascading process of functional decomposition. In particular, although at each stage 
of this process new function attributions are made, we might expect the fragments 
of mechanism hierarchy they induce to always be embedded or otherwise combined 
with other local fragments to form a single, more elaborate localized hierarchy, one 
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that we can maintain a straightforwardly realist attitude towards. This realist inter-
pretation is threatened by the possibility that levels may crosscut one another, i.e. 
that a single functional analysis might induce two (or more) distinct decompositions, 
such that token entities occur at the same level relative to one decomposition and at 
different levels relative to another. If a single functional analysis could in principle 
produce crosscutting hierarchies within a spatiotemporally localized system, then 
one could not infer any unique hierarchical organization for this system, not even 
of a locally circumscribed sort. More generally, the hierarchical organization of any 
particular mechanistic model would not guarantee the uniqueness of that hierarchi-
cal organization in the world, thus threatening LHR.
Nevertheless, the process of functional decomposition does seem to allow for 
crosscutting hierarchies of the same functionally individuated and spatiotempo-
rally circumscribed components. The key point is just that the assignment of an I–O 
function to a particular entity has rippling consequences, spreading out from that 
entity to identify the other members of its level of causal interaction. The functional 
decomposition of an entity at one level into its component parts then assigns these 
parts subsidiary functions, but nothing guarantees that the subsidiary function of an 
entity at one level might not ripple out and engage in direct causal interactions with 
entities already localized by its parent function at some different level. Causal inter-
actions across levels such as this pose a challenge to LHR, as they induce new levels 
that ‘crosscut’ the existing hierarchy. The primary response of the hierarchy realist 
against this possibility is the application of the C–B principle: any putative inter-
level cause may be decomposed into a chain of intra-level causes and componency 
relations. But the C–B principle cuts both ways—given two crosscutting hierarchies, 
a defender of either may adopt the C–B principle to explain away its competitor’s 
putative causes. Yet this power to translate causal structure between multiple hierar-
chies undermines realism about any particular hierarchical organization.
Here’s an abstract description of the worry: suppose that a functional decom-
position F assigns subsidiary I–O functions s and t to parts of a spatiotemporally 
localized system X. Call the layers of causal interaction induced by s and t, S and T 
respectively. Now suppose that S and T crosscut each other, i.e. by the lights of S(X), 
a causally interacts with b and c is a lower level component of a, while by the lights 
of T(X), b causally interacts with c, which is itself still a component of the higher 
level entity a (Fig. 2). Taking inspiration from Craver and Bechtel, we can define the 
apparent causal relations in a mechanism  (∙) as the transitive closure of any path 
of cause and composition relations (in either direction). Then it is easy to see that 
 (S(X)) = (T(X)), and consequently the two hierarchies are consistent as analyses 
of apparent causal structure. But the two hierarchies also crosscut one another, so 
the upshot is that I–O analysis by itself is insufficient to derive a unique mechanistic 
hierarchy, at most it can resolve apparent causal structure without specifying which 
hierarchy is ‘real’.
Function attributions determine hierarchical structure, but in principle the process 
of functional decomposition may produce crosscutting causal hierarchies within 
a mechanistic explanation of a single phenomenon. The C–B principle saves this 
picture from inconsistency, by showing that apparent crosscutting causes may be 
made consistent. The cost of consistency, though, is abandoning the idea of a unique 
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hierarchical decomposition of the system, even in a tightly circumscribed and local 
sense. Since LHR is the view that, at least locally, there is a unique hierarchical 
decomposition of any mechanism, this shows that LHR doesn’t follow as a matter 
of course from realism about mechanistic explanations—i.e. brute realism about 
mechanisms as scientific explanations isn’t enough to ensure a general metaphysical 
picture that is richer than mere aggregate causes.
This is an in-principle challenge to LHR, but should it worry a naturalistic met-
aphysician? Perhaps localized crosscutting hierarchies are logically possible but 
nomologically impossible? Or perhaps the actual practice of scientists when func-
tionally decomposing complex phenomena prohibits crosscutting hierarchies? In the 
next section we present a concrete example that demonstrates crosscutting is a genu-
ine empirical possibility, and thus a serious threat to local hierarchy realism.
4  Crosscutting Hierarchies in Practice
In this section we examine one apparent example of crosscutting mechanism hierar-
chies derived through analysis of a single overarching phenomenon. While we sus-
pect that crosscutting hierarchies may be common in certain explanatory domains 
(especially those of the biological and social sciences), all that is needed to block 
the naturalistic defense of LHR is a single counterexample. The challenge for any 
putative counterexample is to ensure it satisfies the locality constraints on LHR, and 
we conclude the section by comparing our example to a prima facie similar case 
where locality is indeed violated, in order to tease out the sense in which our exam-
ple poses a genuine challenge to LHR.
Fig. 2  Component c is a sub-component of component a. Components a and b causally interact for S(X), 
and thus sit at the same mechanistic level, while b and c causally interact, and thus occupy the same 
level, for T(X). Therefore the componential hierarchy of one function attribution, S(X), cross-cuts that of 
another, T(X)
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The single target phenomenon at issue is neural computation, and in particular 
the inducement of a particular token neuron to fire as part of a neural computation. 
Neural computation is typically explained in terms of a mechanistic hierarchy, with 
neurons arrayed at a single level, engaging in a characteristic activity of induc-
ing each other to fire through synaptic transmission (Boone and Piccinini 2016; 
Elber-Dorozko and Shagrir 2019; Piccinini and Bahar 2013). Looking down into 
individual neurons, the action potential explains the internal mechanism by which 
firing occurs; looking up, neurons are embedded in broad networks, as determined 
by the pattern of connection between axons and dendrites; families of neurons and 
entire brain regions may likewise be identified with higher organizational levels of 
neural computation (Kaiser 2007). However, the very same phenomenon, the fir-
ing of a particular neuron as part of the process of neural computation, may also 
be induced through a process distinct from synaptic transmission, namely ephaptic 
coupling. When we examine the mechanistic levels induced by synaptic transmis-
sion and ephaptic coupling, we discover they crosscut each other—token-identical 
entities inhabiting a single level in the first decomposition sit at different levels in 
the second. This example poses a challenge to LHR as it seems that spatiotempo-
rally localized entities (i.e. two token-identical neurons) may interact in a manner 
derived from a single functional decomposition (namely, neural computational role) 
yet which does not result in a unique arrangement of mechanistic levels.
The standard view of neural computation identifies neural firing with the trans-
mission of information in aid of a computation (e.g. Piccinini and Bahar 2013). This 
basic picture is neutral across debates about the exact way in which neural firing 
encodes information, namely whether individual spikes in neural activity, rates of 
spiking, sequences or trains of spikes, or spatial or probabilistic distributions over 
larger-scale patterns of firing should be identified as the vehicles of information. 
Crucial for any of these views is the mechanism by which one neuron causally influ-
ences (exciting or inhibiting) the firing of another. The most studied route for this 
interaction is chemical synaptic transmission (Fig.  3; cf. Shepherd 1994; Craver 
2007: 135–8; Piccinini and Craver 2011). An action potential travels down the axon 
Fig. 3  A schematic decomposition of the local hierarchy responsible for synaptic transmission, where 
black arrows indicate causal interactions, and dashed lines indicate the constitution relation between lev-
els of the hierarchy
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of the pre-synaptic neuron,  Ca2+ enters the end of the axon, inducing the pre-synap-
tic neuron to release neurotransmitters, which in turn cross the synaptic cleft to bind 
to receptors on the post-synaptic neuron’s dendrite. Depending on the nature of the 
neurotransmitters, their effect on the post-synaptic cell will either inhibit its firing, 
or sum with other excitatory signals to induce it to fire itself.
Beginning from an analysis of neural computation as information processing, 
the subsidiary function in this example is transfer of information from one cell to 
another. Identifying this function isolates the pre-synaptic neuron, the post-synaptic 
neuron, and the molecular neurotransmitters released by the first and binding to the 
other as all interacting causally, and thus at the same level of a mechanistic hierar-
chy. The interaction between these components produces the overarching phenom-
enon of synaptic transmission at a higher level of this hierarchy.
Now consider another, less well-known process that also contributes to neural 
firing: ephaptic coupling. Ephaptic coupling occurs when an electromagnetic field 
affects the firing rate of an individual neuron—in a typical case, a field itself gener-
ated by the electromagnetic activity of another group of neurons (see e.g. Anastas-
siou et al. 2011). The possibility of ephaptic coupling was experimentally demon-
strated in the 1940′s (Arvanitaki 1942), and has since then been studied both in vitro 
and in vivo. A point of continued contention concerns whether ephaptic coupling 
plays any significant role in normal brain function. It is relatively uncontentious that 
it can play a role in pathological conditions—for instance, ephaptic coupling ampli-
fies random activity, allowing disruptive neural “cross-talk” between demyelinated 
neurons in trigeminal neuralgia (Love and Coakham 2001). Nevertheless, there is 
also substantial evidence for a non-pathological role; for instance, it has been dem-
onstrated in vivo that ephaptic coupling affects computationally significant features 
of neurons, such as spike timing and threshold of neural response (Anastassiou et al. 
2011); furthermore, recent work has offered evidence that ephaptic coupling func-
tions to regulate periodic neural activity (Chiang et al. 2019). Low frequency peri-
odic activity in the hippocampus is believed to play a role in memory consolidation 
(Dickson 2010). Chiang et  al. (2019) observed the propagation of low frequency 
periodic neural activity of this sort in hippocampal tissue that had been severed in 
order to ensure chemical synaptic transmission played no role. They then developed 
a computer model demonstrating how this propagation may be explained through 
ephaptic coupling induced by an endogenous electromagnetic field (Chiang et  al. 
2019: 261). Their study seems to be a clear case of mechanistic explanation, decom-
posing a system into components and their characteristic interactions, and yet it gen-
erates a causal hierarchy that crosscuts the standard synaptic transmission mecha-
nism outlined above. If ephaptic coupling indeed plays a functional role in neural 
computation, then this crosscutting hierarchy poses a challenge to LHR.
In order to see why, we need to examine the mechanistic structure of ephaptic 
coupling. An endogenous electromagnetic (EM) field is generated by the collective 
behavior of a group of neurons, and is not reducible to the behavior of individual 
neurons, nor a mere aggregate of that behavior. Rather it is a holistic phenomenon, 
depending for its constitutive properties on the neurons’ collective interaction. In 
other words, the EM field occurs at a higher level of the mechanistic hierarchy than 
the generating neurons themselves. However, the causal interaction at issue occurs 
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between this EM field and a single, target neuron, the one entrained by it. In other 
words, because ephaptic coupling occurs between an EM field and a neuron, both 
that neuron and the field should appear on the same level of the corresponding 
mechanistic hierarchy (Fig. 4).
In principle, both of these mechanisms (synaptic transmission and ephaptic cou-
pling) may be active at the same time, involving the same token neurons, satisfy-
ing spatiotemporal locality. Furthermore, they may both contribute to the compu-
tationally significant firing pattern of a single neuron, and may need to be invoked 
simultaneously to provide a full mechanistic explanation of that phenomenon, sat-
isfying functional locality.4 So, a single overarching phenomenon decomposes into 
Fig. 4  A schematic decomposition of the mechanism hierarchy responsible for ephaptic coupling. As in 
the previous diagram, the black arrow indicates a causal interaction between an electromagnetic field and 
a neuron, while the dashed lines indicate that the field is constituted by the activity of some other set of 
neurons, which consequently sit at a lower level of the hierarchy. Each dotted oval designates a distinct 
level of the ephaptic coupling hierarchy, presented left-to-right rather than top-down for reasons that will 
soon become clear
4 Is this example only a problem for a structural account of mechanism realism; would mechanism real-
ists who countenance activities as a distinct ontological category fare better? Not necessarily: Persson 
(2010) argues that activities-based accounts can’t adequately model polygenic causation, cases where 
two distinct causes contribute to a single effect. Plausibly his arguments apply to a case like this, where 
both ephaptic coupling and synaptic transmission may contribute to a single neuron spike train. The case 
becomes even more problematic if we compare electrical synaptic transmission—whereby the electrical 
activity of a neuron induces firing across a synaptic gap, rather than the chemical release of neurotrans-
mitters—and ephaptic coupling. In this case, it seems the very same activity of the pre-synaptic neuron 
(generating a local electrical signal) may causally affect the firing of the post-synaptic neuron through 
two distinct routes, both directly and by means of a higher-level EM field. We do not discuss this exam-
ple in the main text as we are not aware of any empirical work on the interaction between these two 
processes.
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subsidiary functions that induce two distinct mechanistic hierarchies that crosscut 
one another, with a set of components that are situated at one level in the first hierar-
chy appearing at different levels in the second. Relative to the functional decomposi-
tion of synaptic transmission, the pre- and post-synaptic neurons are situated at the 
same mechanistic level, as demonstrated by the fact that they interact causally with 
one another. Relative to the ephaptic coupling functional decomposition, however, 
these very same neurons might be situated at distinct levels, as the electromagnetic 
field acting on the post-synaptic neuron may be constituted by the firing of some 
other set of neurons that includes the pre-synaptic neuron (Fig. 5). In this case the 
pre-synaptic neuron is both involved in generating an electromagnetic field and pro-
ducing neurotransmitters that contribute to the firing of the post-synaptic neuron, 
thereby simultaneously occupying two mechanistically distinct ‘levels’. Thus, there 
is no ‘objective’ fact about whether these neurons are on the same or different levels, 
as their relative positions in the hierarchy change with the attribution of different 
subsidiary functions in the analysis, and so neural computation stands as a counter-
example to LHR.
To tease out what is distinctive about this example, it will be useful to contrast 
it with a prima facie similar case that has been specifically disavowed by localist 
accounts of mechanistic levels.5 Awake craniotomy is a form of brain surgery where 
Fig. 5  The two mechanism hierarchies crosscutting one another. Here the pre-synaptic neuron is part of 
the group of neurons whose activity constitutes the electromagnetic field, which in turn exerts a causal 
influence on the post-synaptic neuron. Entities at a single level of the synaptic hierarchy appear at two 
different levels of the ephaptic hierarchy
5 We thank one of the referees for suggesting this example, which is adapted from Bechtel (2006).
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the neurosurgeon operates on a patient under local anaesthetic, while also talking 
to them, or otherwise engaging their higher mental functions (a musician might be 
asked to sing or play their instrument during the procedure, for instance; Bonhomme 
et  al. 2009; Scerrati 2020). The surgeon’s motor regions control her movements, 
which themselves causally affect the patient’s brain as, say, she removes a tumor 
from near Broca’s area—i.e. the surgeon’s brain and the patient’s brain appear at 
very different levels of any putative organizational hierarchy. Yet, the surgeon may 
be talking to the patient at the very same time, to ensure that no damage is done to 
the patient’s speech as the tumor is removed—i.e. relevant regions of the surgeon’s 
brain and of the patient’s, such as their respective Broca’s areas, seem at the same 
level as they contribute symmetrically to explaining this conversation. Nevertheless, 
a localist account of mechanistic levels rejects the appearance of contradiction here, 
and asserts that this example poses no principled challenge to a sufficiently local 
understanding of mechanism hierarchy realism (cf. Bechtel 2006: Ch. 2). If awake 
craniotomy and neural computation are closely analogous, it seems the example of 
ephaptic coupling cannot charitably be taken to challenge LHR.
In our view, the critical difference between the two cases is that awake crani-
otomy does not satisfy the functional locality constraint, while ephaptic coupling, 
understood through its functional role in neural computation, does. To see this, con-
sider what in the awake craniotomy case may count as the single phenomenon to be 
explained (analogous to the firing of a single neuron), and the single overarching 
functional analysis (analogous to computational role) that results in crosscutting lev-
els. Plausibly, the phenomenon to be explained is the speech uttered by the patient 
during surgery; yet, it is then difficult to see how the modulations in this speech 
induced by conversation with the surgeon and those induced by the interventions 
of her scalpel may be subsumed under the same functional analysis. Aspects of the 
patient’s speech induced conversationally are typically meant as checks on normal 
functioning—patients are asked to name pictured objects, or to perform a task such 
as counting or singing (if they are a professional singer). Conversely, changes to the 
flow of speech caused by the surgical intervention are typically understood as errors 
or disruptions—indicators that a brain region should be avoided if normal function 
is to be preserved (Kim 2009). Thus, the functional roles, and corresponding mecha-
nistic analyses, of aspects of patient speech induced through conversation and those 
induced through surgical intervention on the brain are quite different, and do not 
satisfy functional locality.6
This example emphasizes the importance of the empirical claim that ephaptic 
coupling plays a role in properly functioning neural computation. If ephaptic cou-
pling plays a purely pathological role, as in trigeminal neuralgia, then it does not 
6 Plausibly, the awake craniotomy case also violates spatiotemporal locality—the Broca’s areas of any 
two people are spatially distant, and insofar as they are engaged in a single functional interaction through 
conversation, the mechanism involved is transient and unstable, as is the mechanism of a surgical inter-
vention. We do not wish to take a stand here on the importance of regular versus transient mechanisms 
for mechanism realism (cf. Andersen 2012), but it is worth emphasing that the ephaptic coupling case is 
tightly spatiotemporally circumscribed (as the token neurons involved are adjacent or at least in constant 
synaptic contact) unlike the case of conversation or surgery.
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pose a challenge to a locally hierarchical understanding of neural computation. In 
that case, ephaptic coupling could indeed be understood as a process that is func-
tionally distinct from synaptic transmission, and thus simultaneous realism about 
the hierarchical structure of synaptic information transmission and the hierarchical 
structure of ephaptic coupling would not contradict LHR, as they would represent 
two functionally distinct mechanism hierarchies. Recall that the target of a struc-
tural account of mechanism realism is to identify the distinctive patterns of causal 
and composition relations in the world that constitute mechanisms. The mere causal 
interaction of an EM field on a particular neuron is not by itself enough to carve up 
the relations that constitute mechanisms in the world, it must be subsumed under a 
functional analysis to count as a candidate for a real mechanism. The pathological 
and computational functions of ephaptic coupling would thus have different implica-
tions for mechanism realism.
5  Mechanism Structure Beyond Local Hierarchies
Mechanistic explanations are constructed through functional analysis, but functional 
decomposition does not guarantee that levels do not crosscut, and so inconsistent 
hierarchies are possible, both in principle and in practice. This result renders hier-
archies of even local levels inadequate as an account of the distinctive metaphysi-
cal structure of mechanisms. The aim of this section is to formalize LHR as a first 
step toward specifying the space of possible forms of mechanism realism that aban-
don local hierarchies, yet nevertheless resist collapse into mere aggregate causes. 
An open question is whether weaker metaphysical positions that are consistent with 
crosscutting hierarchies are still ‘mechanistic’ in any intuitive sense.
From a structural standpoint there are three kinds of constraints needed to specify 
the distinctive features of mechanisms: constraints on composition, i.e. the relation-
ship between entities understood at different degrees of granularity; constraints on 
interaction, i.e. the types of (typically causal) relationships that may occur between 
entities; and constraints on the relationship between composition and interaction. In 
an abstract, formal sense, both composition and interaction may be thought of as 
relations between entities, characterized by certain properties. A hierarchical mech-
anism may be understood as a structure in which the interplay between these two 
relations (compositional and causal) is mutually constraining, with causal interac-
tions occurring only between entities at the same level of composition, and levels 
of composition being defined in terms of the possibility of causal interactions. The 
possibility of crosscutting hierarchies within a single functionally localized system 
shows that this condition of mutual constraint must be rejected by the mechanism 
realist. If this condition is rejected, however, is there any sense in which the remain-
ing structure may be understood as distinctively mechanistic, as opposed to a mere 
aggregation of causal and compositional relations? In order to answer this question, 
we need to first introduce a few formal details.
Let < represent the composition relation, i.e. read a < b as ‘a is a component of b’. 
As mechanists understand it, < is something like the proper parthood relation stud-
ied by mereologists. Proper parthood is typically thought to be both irreflexive (not 
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a < a) and antisymmetric (a < b and a ≠ b implies not b < a), i.e. < is asymmetric: if 
a is a component of b, then b is not a component of a (Koslicki 2008; McDaniel 
2009). This is an assumption about composition that corresponds to the strict hierar-
chy of layers of entities posited by LHR. Affirming that < is asymmetric constitutes 
a substantive position, rejecting, for instance, arguments that proper parthood might 
be susceptible to mereological loops (Tillman and Fowler 2012). Furthermore, 
mereologists typically consider proper parthood to be transitive (a < b and b < c 
implies a < c), yet composition as understood in the functionally localized sense of 
mechanists is arguably not transitive, as (intuitively) if an entity is a component of a 
sub-mechanism, it is not (necessarily) also a component of the mechanism of which 
that sub-mechanism is a part (Seibt 2014; cf. Craver 2015: 14).7
Next, let a ⊏ b represent the interaction relation, i.e. ‘a (causally) interacts with 
b’. Like < , one might consider ⊏ to be irreflexive: a does not interact with itself. 
Unlike < , ⊏ might not be anti-symmetric, though: if a and b are entities, and a ⊏ b, 
we might also wish to allow that b ⊏ a. The exact nature of ⊏ is less specified in the 
mechanism literature than that of < ; nevertheless, ⊏ could be fleshed out in a variety 
of ways, drawing for instance on the literature on the logical structure of causality. 
One issue up for debate, for instance, is whether interaction should be thought of as 
transitive—a property endorsed by some in the logic of causation literature (Koons 
1999) and denied by others (Scheffler 1993). The point is just that, for both < and ⊏, 
there is room for debate about exactly which formal properties they will satisfy, and 
a full-fledged structural account of mechanism realism will need to commit on those 
properties.
What LHR adds to asymmetric, intransitive composition and irreflexive, (poten-
tially) symmetric interaction is a restriction on how composition and interaction are 
permitted to combine, i.e. the mutual constraint that we mentioned previously. To 
state this restriction formally, we need a few more definitions. Write < T for the tran-
sitive closure of < , and ⊏ST for the symmetric, transitive closure of ⊏. The ‘family’ 
of a, Fa, is the set of all entities x such that a < T x or x < T a. Crucially, note that, 
since composition is irreflexive, a ∉ Fa. The “peer group” of a, [a], is the set of all x 
such that a ⊏ST x. Since ⊏ST is symmetric, a ∈ [a]. Intuitively, the family of a are all 
entities other than a related to it by some chain of composition relations, while the 
peer group is the set of all entities a is related to by some chain of interactions, i.e. 
all entities at the same ‘level’ as a. Then, the fundamental constraint on composition 
and interaction endorsed by LHR may be stated as:
This constraint rules out cross-level interactions, as required by the C–B princi-
ple. To see why, suppose a and b are on different levels of a mechanistic hierarchy, 





∩ [x] = �
)
7 Some passages in Craver (e.g. 2007:193; 2015:19) are most naturally read as advocating realism about 
compositional levels only. Without wanting to take a stance on Craver exegesis, we note that realism 
about compositional levels only is not a form of mechanism realism in our sense, as it cannot distinguish 
mechanisms from other aggregates of causal and compositional relations.
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is some c such that b ⊏ST c and c ∈ Fa (by the definition of level). But then, by the 
transitivity of ⊏ST, a ⊏ST c, and so c ∈ [a] as well, and the constraint is violated. In 
other words, no member of the family of an entity may (causally) interact with it, 
and no member of the peer group of an entity may be in its family, or, in more famil-
iar terms, causal interactions may only occur between entities at the same level, and 
entities must be at the same level if they causally interact. It is important to clarify 
here that x ranges only over the entities in some narrowly defined spatiotemporal 
region, and ⊏ is restricted to some set of functionally-relevant interactions, rather 
than over all entities and interactions in the world—this is the force of the assertion 
that mechanistic hierarchies are purely local. Within this narrow region, the claims 
of mechanism hierarchy realism are substantive, and are violated by the possibility 
of crosscutting functional hierarchies.
A non-trivial mechanism realism requires an account of structure in the world 
substantial enough to differentiate it from mere aggregate causation, yet weak 
enough to allow crosscutting hierarchies. What this means is that one can’t simply 
identify as a mechanism realist by taking a stance on the relational structure of cau-
sation and the relational structure of composition—one must also say something 
about how they interact to distinguish mechanisms from bare aggregates. One could 
propose a weaker constraint on the relationship between composition and causation 
than LHR, for instance by going very local and defining “family” and “peer group” 
in terms of < and ⊏ directly (rather than their transitive closures)—however, this still 
isn’t going to be enough to escape crosscutting in the ephaptic coupling case, as 
plausibly there are no intervening compositional levels between neurons and their 
EM field, nor causal intermediaries between the field affected neurons.
A more promising strategy may at first seem to be simply adding additional struc-
ture. Andersen (2012), for instance, suggests a dynamical constraint on the regular-
ity of activities, while Kaiser and Krickel (2017) argue that “activities” should be 
understood to include not only causal interactions but, say, instantiation of disposi-
tions (amongst other additions). But simply expanding the number of ontological 
base categories is not by itself going to escape the problem of crosscutting hierar-
chies, which will continue to obtain for causality and composition no matter what 
additional ontological categories are added to the model. Conversely, the recent for-
mal approach of List (2019) simply takes levels as a primitive, yet this also is unsuit-
able for the would-be mechanism realist, since the example of crosscutting levels 
shows that a hierarchy of levels may not be the correct characterization of a distinc-
tively mechanistic organization of entities and activities.
Mechanists often state their position as if it is near trivial, feeling the need to 
defend it against the worry that everything constitutes a mechanism (Craver and 
Tabery 2015). Furthermore, they feel comfortable asserting that causal interactions 
or compositional relations that violate strict mechanistic hierarchies are suspect, or 
draped in a “shroud of mystery” (Craver and Bechtel 2007, 562). Our purpose in 
stating the commitments of LHR in this new way is to shift intuitions on this issue. 
What we hope to have accomplished in this section is to establish that (1) the asser-
tion of hierarchy realism is substantive, and severely restricts the permitted interplay 
between mereology and causality, even when it is functionally and spatiotempo-
rally localized. Furthermore, (2) while there are a variety of different choices to be 
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made about the formal structure of causality and composition considered separately, 
mechanism realism requires some further condition on the mutually constraining 
relationship between cause and composition, for it is precisely the organization of 
entities and their interactions that distinguishes mechanisms from other aggregates 
of entities and causes in the world. Finally, (3) while this whole discussion may be 
read as a reductio of the desert ontology approach, a demand for a richer set of prim-
itives (capacities, dispositions, etc.) or more elaborate constraints (regularity) does 
not by itself escape the fundamental tension between functional decomposition and 
the embedding of mechanisms into local hierarchies.
6  Conclusion
Mechanism realists are committed to the existence of some objective structure in 
the world that is richer than the mere aggregation of causes. One strategy for iden-
tifying this richer mechanistic structure proceeds by functional decomposition, first 
identifying a system that produces a target phenomenon, and then isolating entities 
and their characteristic activities through the subsidiary functions they serve in gen-
erating that phenomenon. We have identified the hierarchical arrangement of mecha-
nisms into layers of entities and activities that is presumed to fall out of functional 
analysis as a plausible foundation for mechanism realism. We call realism about the 
arrangement of entities and activities into a strict hierarchy of layers local hierar-
chy realism, to distinguish it from the universal hierarchy realism that is generally 
rejected by mechanists.
LHR has the advantage of placing a substantive and precisely stateable constraint 
on the relationship between mereology and causality. The organization of entities 
and activities to which it is committed is not reducible to mere aggregate causation, 
and it clearly satisfies intuitive and informal definitions of mechanism. Yet LHR is 
not an a priori consequence of functional decomposition. So long as mechanistic 
explanations are produced through functional decomposition, there is a danger they 
permit causal interactions that crosscut entities into competing hierarchies. Moreo-
ver, there appear to be such crosscutting hierarchies in the world, as the joint role of 
synaptic transmission and ephaptic coupling in the production of neural firing illus-
trates. So, LHR seems to be untenable.
We concluded by suggesting there are substantive positions the mechanism realist 
might take on the arrangement of causes and composition relations in the world that 
both avoid the charge that mechanisms reduce to mere aggregation of causes, yet 
accommodate the possibility of crosscutting hierarchies; but these weaker metaphys-
ical commitments do not obviously satisfy intuitive notions of mechanism (as LHR 
did). As we see it, then, there are two paths forward for the would-be mechanism 
realist: (i) defend LHR by identifying a principled procedure for prioritizing hierar-
chies when crosscutting examples appear; or (ii) define a constraint on the relation-
ship between mereology and causality weaker than that of LHR, yet still intuitively 
recognizable as satisfying informal definitions of mechanism. Alternatively, one 
could remain a scientific realist while abandoning mechanism realism, endorsing a 
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generic realism about mechanistic explanations but denying that ‘mechanisms’ per 
se are a well-defined or scientifically distinguished class of structures in the world.
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